Revisiting Searle on Deriving Ought from Is 1st Edition by Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi 3030541150 9783030541156

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ISBN 10: 3030541150

ISBN 13: 9783030541156

Author: Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi 

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving “Ought” from “Is”. John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive “Ought ” from “Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an “is” – it simply follows that you “ought” to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action.   The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law.  With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of “Ought”; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only “Ought” from “Is”, but “Is” from “Ought”.  

Revisiting Searle on Deriving Ought from Is 1st Table of contents:

Part I

1. How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” Revisited

2. An Interview with John R. Searle

Part II

3. Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?

4. Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisited

5. Some Remarks on Searle’s View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning

6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules

7. Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View

8. How to Derive Is from Ought

9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules

10. “Ought” Is Spoken in Many Ways

11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law

12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is- and Ought-Statements?

13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is

14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”

15. On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective

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