Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind 1st editon by Brian McLaughlin, Jonathan Cohen 1119637031 9781119637035

PART I: MENTAL CONTENT

IS THERE A VIABLE NOTION OF NARROW MENTAL CONTENT?

CHAPTER ONE: Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions

1. Background

2. Doubting Definitions

3. Paderewski Variations

4. DeRe and De Dicto

5. Attitude Attributions, Neologisms, and Generalizations

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWO: There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content

1. Narrow and Broad Content

2. Narrow Narrow Content

3. Epistemic Narrow Content16

4. Thoroughly Narrow Content

5. Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

IS EXTERNALISM ABOUT MENTAL CONTENT COMPATIBLE WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS?

CHAPTER THREE: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent

1. Anti‐individualism

2. The McKinsey Problem

3. Types of Response to the McKinsey Problem

4. Anti‐individualism Does Not Imply (2)

5. Reconsideration of McKinsey’s Position

6. Problems for McKinsey

7. Unproblematic Privileged Access to the World?

8. Conclusion

Acknowledgment

References

Notes

CHAPTER FOUR: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent

1. The Reductio Argument for Incompatibilism

2. The Proper Response to the Reductio

3. Why Semantic Externalism (SE) Is True

4. The Retreat to MSE Is Unmotivated

5. Individuating Thoughts

6. What’s Wrong with Metaphysical Externalism (ME)

References

Notes

IS THE INTENTIONAL ESSENTIALLY NORMATIVE?

CHAPTER FIVE: Resisting Normativism in Psychology

1. The Background Normativity Claims

2. Norms and Psychology3

3. Wedgwood’s Arguments

4. General Qualms

References

Notes

CHAPTER SIX: Normativism Defended

1. A Version of the Claim That “the Intentional Is Normative”

2. An Argument for the Claim That “the Intentional Is Normative”

3. A Hopelessly Panglossian Picture of the Mind?

4. Psychology, A Priori and Empirical

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

IS THERE NON‐CONCEPTUAL CONTENT?

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Revenge of the Given

1. Introduction

2. Kinds of Representations

3. Some Data at Last

4. Conclusion

Reference

Note

CHAPTER EIGHT: Are There Different Kinds of Content?

1. What Is Conceptual Structure?

2. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Cognitive Maps

3. What Non‐conceptual Content Is: Visual Perception

4. Syntax and Semantics

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

PART II: PHYSICALISM

IS NON‐REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM VIABLE?

CHAPTER NINE: Everybody Has Got It

References

Notes

CHAPTER TEN: The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism

1. An Epistemological Detour

2. The Independent Case for Theoreticity

3. Totting up the Prospects: Sensory Qualia

4. Totting Up the Prospects: The Propositional Attitudes

5. Is There a Residual Case for Propositional Attitudes in Humans?

References

Notes

SHOULD PHYSICALISTS BE A PRIORI PHYSICALISTS?

CHAPTER ELEVEN: A Priori Physicalism

1. Physicalism and the Mind–Brain Identity Theory

2. The Disagreement between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalism

3. De Re versus De Dicto Versions of the Debate

4. The Epistemological Argument from Zombies for A Priori Physicalism

5. The Semantic Argument for A Priori Physicalism

6. Some (Substantial) Tidying Up

7. The Analogy with Shapes and the Relevance of Functionalism

8. De Re A Posteriori Physicalism and the Problem of Distancing De Re A Posteriori Physicalism from Dual Attribute Theories

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWELVE: On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism

1. Common Ground

2. Disputed Territory

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

IS THERE AN UNRESOLVED PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION?

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Causation and Mental Causation

1

2

4

5

6

References

Notes

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough

1. What Is “Non‐Reductive Physicalism?”

2. Why NRP Replaced RP

3. The Exclusion Argument Defanged

References

Notes

PART III: THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE

IS CONSCIOUSNESS ONTOLOGICALLY EMERGENT FROM THE PHYSICAL?

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Dualist Emergentism

1. Conscious Individuals and Consciousness Properties

2. The Evolution of Consciousness

3. Substance Dualism

4. Qualitatively New Properties

5. Subject Causation

6. Causal Relevance of Consciousness Properties

7. Why Believe in Subject Causation?

8. The Adequacy of Amazement

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness

1. Introduction

2. The Emergentist Idea

3. Some Non‐Starters

4. Anodyne Novelty

5. The Role of Ontological Emergence

6. How to Implement the Role of Emergence

7. More than Merely Nomological Supervenience

8. Analytic Necessitarianism

9. An Ontology of Powers

10. Necessitarianism with Strong Necessity

11. Other Roles for Ontological Emergence

12. Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

ARE PHENOMENAL CHARACTERS AND INTENTIONAL CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCES IDENTICAL?

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: New Troubles for the Qualia Freak

1. Against Phenomenal Dualism

2. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Intrinsic Properties

3. Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Nonrepresentational Properties

4. Phenomenal Externalism

5. Lolita, XP1, and Bodily Sensations

6. An Alternative Proposal and Some Final Thoughts on Qualia

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: A Case for Qualia

1

2

3

4

5

References

Notes

IS AWARENESS OF OUR MENTAL ACTS A KIND OF PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS?

CHAPTER NINETEEN: All Consciousness Is Perceptual

1. Perceptual Consciousness

2. Action

3. Thinking

4. Why Peacocke’s View Isn’t PC

5. Conclusion

References

CHAPTER TWENTY: Mental Action andSelf‐Awareness (I)

1. The Distinctive Features of Action‐Awareness

2. The Nature and Range of Mental Actions

3. The Principal Hypothesis and Its Consequences

4. The Principal Hypothesis: Attractions and Possibilities

5. Describing and Explaining Schizophrenic Experience

6. The First Person in Action Self‐Ascriptions

7. Concluding Remarks: Rational Agency and Action‐Awareness

Acknowledgments

References

Notes

PART IV: PERCEPTION AND MENTAL CAPACITIES

SHOULD PERCEPTION BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATION, DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE WORLD, OR A HYBRID VIEW?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐ONE: Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science

1. Naïve Realism

2. The Slightest Philosophy

3. Is Naïve Realism Inconsistent with Contemporary Vision Science?

4. Cognitive Penetration

5. Multimodal Perception

6. Dorsal and Ventral Visual Streams

7. Unconscious Perception

8. Conclusion

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐TWO: Naïve Realism v. Representationalism

1. Internal Dependence: The Organismic Contribution to Experience

2. Representationalism Accommodates Internal Dependence

3. Basic Naïve Realism v. Representationalism

4. French and Phillips’s Modified Naïve Realism v. Representationalism

5. Conclusion

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐THREE: Capacities‐First Philosophy

1. What Is Explanatorily Fundamental in an Analysis of Perception?

2. Why Analyze the Mind in Terms of Mental Capacities?

3. The Hallucination Question and Perceptual Particularity

4. Particularism and Attributionalism

5. The Commitments of Capacities‐First Philosophy

6. Perceptual Capacities

7. Ways of Perceiving, Perceptual Capacities, and Modes of Presentations

References

Notes

IS PERCEPTION GENERAL, PARTICULAR, OR A HYBRID?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐FOUR: Perceiving Particulars

1. Introduction

2. Two Arguments for Existentialism

3. Two Objections to Existentialism

4. Perceptual Awareness of Particulars

5. Visual Objects

Acknowledgment

References

CHAPTER TWENTY‐FIVE: Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content

1. Background

2. Alleged Benefits of Abstract Content

3. Alleged Benefits of Particular Content

4. The Pluralist View: The Best of Both Theories

5. Conclusion

References

Notes

HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND COGNITION?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐SIX: The Perception–Cognition Border

1. Introduction

2. The Dimension Restriction Hypothesis

3. Objections to DRH

4. The Full Iconicity View

5. Challenges to Block’s Format‐Based View

6. Block on Iconic Object Representations

7. Conclusion

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐SEVEN: Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File

1. Perceptual Object Representations Are Iconic

2. Object Files of Working Memory and Thought

References

Note

IS PAIN A NATURAL KIND?

CHAPTER TWENTY‐EIGHT: Scientific Eliminativism for Pain

1. Introduction: Clarifying the Landscape

2. The Promiscuity of Pain

3. Spotlight on Utility

4. What the Problem Is and What It Isn’t

5. Conclusion: Why It Matters

References

Notes

CHAPTER TWENTY‐NINE: Pain Is a Natural Kind

Introduction

1. Why Theorizing about Pain Is Such a Pain (a Quick Recap)

2. Natural Kinds for Psychology

3. Moderate Pluralism about Pain

4. The Eliminativist Alternative

5. Concluding Thoughts

References

Notes

DO WE NEED IMAGINATION OVER AND ABOVE IMAGERY AND SUPPOSITION?

CHAPTER THIRTY: Against Imagination

1. How Not to Explain the Mind

2. Varieties of Skepticism about Imagination

3. Mental Imagery

4. Mental Imagery and Imagination

5. Sensory Imagination / Propositional Imagination / Supposition

6. Mental Imagery in Propositional Attitudes

7. Between Sensory Imagination and Supposition

8. Conclusion: Imagistic versus Linguistic Cognition

References

Notes

CHAPTER THIRTY‐ONE: Why We Need Imagination

1. What Imagination Is

2. The Challenges from Supposition and Conception

3. The Challenge from Belief

4. The Reductionist Challenge

5. Concluding Remarks

References

Notes

Index

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