Information Economics with Real Estate Applications 1st Edition by Fredrik Armerin, Madeleine Hoeft ISBN 9781032287744 1032287748

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ISBN 10: 1032287748
ISBN 13: 9781032287744
Author: Fredrik Armerin, Madeleine Hoeft

Information Economics with Real Estate Applications 1st Edition Table of contents:

Part I Foundations

1 Basic microeconomics

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Consumers

1.2.1 Preferences

1.2.2 Utility and utility functions

1.2.3 Utility maximisation

1.2.4 Demand

The demand function of a consumer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function

1.2.5 Substitutes and complements

1.3 Producers

1.3.1 Costs

1.3.2 Profit

1.4 Markets

1.4.1 Competitive markets

1.4.2 Monopolies

1.4.3 Summary of different market forms

1.5 Welfare

1.5.1 Welfare for consumers and producers

1.5.2 Welfare on market level

1.5.3 Pareto efficiency

1.6 Literature notes

1.7 Exercises

2 Game theory

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Static games

2.2.1 Prisoner’s dilemma

2.2.2 Stag hunt

2.2.3 Chicken game

2.3 Dynamic games

2.3.1 Subgames

2.3.2 Subgame perfect Nash equilibria

2.3.3 Folk theorems

2.4 Literature notes

2.5 Exercises

Part II Market perspective

3 Oligopolies

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Cournot models

3.2.1 Symmetric Cournot models

3.2.2 Symmetric Cournot duopoly

3.2.3 Cartels

3.2.4 Symmetric general Cournot oligopoly model

3.2.5 Asymmetric Cournot models

3.3 Bertrand models

3.4 Stackelberg models

Concluding notes on oligopolies

3.5 Monopolistic competition

3.6 Measuring market concentration

3.7 Literature notes

3.8 Exercises

4 Strategic interactions

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Market entry strategies

4.2.1 Market conditions

4.2.2 An entry game – Part I

4.2.3 An entry game – Part II

4.2.4 Taxonomy of strategies

4.3 Literature notes

4.4 Exercises

Part III Organisational perspective

5 Models with randomness

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Randomness

5.2.1 Probabilities and random variables

5.2.2 Preferences over random payoffs

5.3 Risk

5.3.1 Attitudes towards risk

5.3.2 Coefficient of absolute risk aversion

5.3.3 Certainty equivalent

5.3.4 Optimal risk-sharing

5.4 Risk and uncertainty

5.5 Literature notes

5.6 Exercises

6 Contracts

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Theory of the firm

6.3 Principal-agent relationships

6.4 Contract types

6.5 Complete and incomplete contracts

6.6 Asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour

6.7 Literature notes

6.8 Exercises

7 Hidden characteristics and adverse selection

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Separating and pooling equilibria

7.3 Hidden characteristics and adverse selection

A All sellers and buyers have full information

B Neither the sellers nor the buyers have full information

C The sellers have full information, and the buyers have no information

Final remarks

7.4 Methods to avoid adverse selection

7.4.1 Screening

7.4.2 Signalling

7.5 Literature notes

7.6 Exercises

8 Hidden actions and moral hazard

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Motivation in principal-agent relationships

8.3 Models with hidden actions

8.3.1 Effort-dependent revenue

8.3.2 Effort-dependent cost

8.3.3 Unknown cost function

8.4 First-best solutions

8.4.1 Effort-dependent revenue

8.4.2 Effort-dependent cost

8.4.3 Unknown cost function

8.5 Methods to avoid moral hazard

8.5.1 Contract structures and incentives

8.5.2 Information systems and performance monitoring

8.5.3 Trust and relationship building

8.6 Literature notes

8.7 Exercises

9 Property rights

9.1 Externalities

9.2 Coase theorem

9.3 Hold-up problem

9.4 Vertical integration

9.5 Literature notes

9.6 Exercises

Appendix A Additional material

A.1 Derivatives

A.2 Mixed strategies

A.3 Behavioural game theory

A.4 Symmetric general Cournot models

A.5 Monopolistic competition

A.6 Concave and convex functions

A.7 Approximation for certainty equivalent

A.8 Mathematics of the Stiglitz model

A.9 Calculations for the effort-depending model

A.10 Calculations for the unkown cost model

A.11 Calculations without vertical integration

The retailer

The producer

Solutions to the exercises

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Fredrik Armerin,Madeleine Hoeft,Information Economics,Real Estate Applications